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SELF-PUBLICATION DEFAMATION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Every year employers distribute millions of references concerning the character and
qualifications of former employees. 1 Although most of these references are favorable,
many are inaccurate, unjust, and sometimes ruinous. 2 The courts have used defa mation
law both to deter the employer abuse and carelessness that produce sonic of the inac-
curate references, and to compensate former employees for resulting harm to their
careers.' Courts, however, have partially insulated employers from liability by granting
them a "qualified privilege" to defame which employees may overcome by a showing of
employer abuse.' This limited liability framework balances two competing interests.
Society and employers have an interest in facilitating the flow of information between
management and personnel. 5 Employees have a competing interest in acquiring protec-
tion against inaccurate statements that injure reputations and employment opportunities.
Traditional defamation law, however, does not protect employees who are dis-
charged for false and defamatory reasons and subsequently are compelled to repeat
those reasons to prospective employers during the interview process!' Since 1946, six
jurisdictions have responded to this gap in the protective web by recognizing "self-
publication defamation" in the employment context.' Consequently, even though they
have not communicated the reasons for termination to a third party, employers may be
liable for defamatiori merely for having informed employees of those reasons."
Historically, injured employees had no cause of action when employers revealed to
them defamatory reasons for their discharge and the employees subsequently had to
repeat these reasons to a prospective employer." Employees in this predicament first
' Note, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 Hasty, C.R.-C.L, L. REV.
143, 143 (1977). Although surveys of businesses reveal different estimates of the prevalence of
reference checking, researchers agree that more than 50% of employers review references. Id. at
146.
Id. at 143.
3 1d. at 144.
W, PitossEu, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW of `rotas § 115, at 824-25 (5th ed. 1984). See aLso infra
text accompanying note 30.
5 Note, supra note 1, at 144. Employers need to know about the qualifications and character of
job applicants. Imposing liability may restrict prospective employers from gaining access to this
information. See infra text accompanying notes 203-209.
6
 Traditional defamation law requires that the defamar, rather than the injured party, commu-
nicate the defamatory statement to a third party. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
g 577 (1977) (discussion of publication element of defamation action).
See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980);
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16
Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 699
S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.
Civ, App. 1980).
B See, e.g., McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 797-98, 168 Cal, Rptr. at 94.
9 When the defendant communicates only to the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot create a lawsuit
merely by repeating the statement. See, e.g., Carson v. Southern Ry. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1104, 1113
(U.S.C. 1979); Church of Scientology of California v. Green, 354 F. Supp, 800, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
see also 50 AN,. _lux. 20 Libel and Slander § 149 (1970).
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gained protection in Georgia in 1946W when the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
defamatory communication to an employee constituted a publication where the employer
could foresee that the employee would be required to repeat the communication, and
such a result followed.'' The six jurisdictions that currently recognize employee self-
publication defamation require an employer to foresee that an employee will republish
the employer's defamatory statement. Those jurisdictions require different degrees of
employer foreseeability and employee compulsion to republish in order for plaintiffs to
establish liability.' 2
This note analyzes the use of the self-publication doctrine in the employment con-
text. Section I discusses traditional defamation law and the development of the qualified
privilege for employers.' 3 It reviews the initial grant of the privilege and then presents
the various standards which different jurisdictions use to determine when an employer
has abused the privilege." Section II discusses the origins of self-publication defamation
law and its application to the employment context. 15
 It examines the justification for the
doctrine and analyzes the current standards that courts use to implement the doctrine.' 6
Section III analyzes the self-publication doctrine in the six jurisdictions. This section
concludes that, although the doctrine achieves the goal of shielding terminated employ-
ees from potential ruin, this extension of defamation law, if improperly designed, results
in such increased employer liability that it inhibits the flow of management-personnel
information.'? This note suggests that the trend recognizing the doctrine should continue
so as to protect employees. 18 Courts, however, should tailor the doctrine in order to
preserve employment-related communicatiorOg Courts must require plaintiffs to show
more than negligence so as to provide employers more flexibility when communicating
the reasons for discharge to employees. 20
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW DEFAMATION AND THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE TO
DEFAME
A. Initial Development
Defamation is a communication of an untrue statement to a third person which
injures someone's reputation. 21
 Under the early common law of defamation, courts
1 " Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307.
" The court cited an exception noted in 36 C.J. Libel and Slander § 172, at 1225 (1924); see also
infra note 78 for the text of the exception.
12 Compare Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (employer
as a reasonably prudent person should have expected that employee would republish) with J'..! c C 'wit! y,
110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 168 Cal, Rptr. at 94 (requiring employee to have acted under a strong
compulsion to republish) and Brantley v. Heller, 101 Ga. App. 16, 21, 112 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1960)
(requiring employee to have had a legal Obligation to republish).
13 See infra notes 21-58 and accompanying text.
" Id.
15 See infra notes 59-177 and accompanying text.
16
17 See infra notes 178-224 and accompanying text.
" See infra text accompanying note 227.
It' See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
21 RESTATEMENT, ,Supra note 6, § 558. The Restatement sets forth the elements of defamation
as follows: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication
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required a plaintiff to prove that a defendant's statement was motivated by malice. 22 By
the early nineteenth century, though, courts inferred the presence of malice front the
mere defamatory publication." Strict liability, therefore, became the basic standard of
the prima facie defamation case." Thus, a defatnor was liable for damages resulting
from a defamatory statement regardless of intent, recklessness or carelessness."
The common law recognized, however, that the imposition of strict liability would
hinder the flow of important information. Courts therefore created a privilege to defame
for communicators "acting in the furtherance of some interest of social importance."
Those persons communicating this important information were entitled to protection
even at the expense of uncompensated harm to a plaintiff's reputation. 2° Courts rec-
ognized that certain communications that concerned matters of public importance out-
weighed a plaintiff's interest in vindicating his or her reputation. 27 "Fh us, they interpreted
the law to prevent the sell-censorship that would result from defamation liability.'"
Courts thus have fashioned two types of privilege. First, certain public matters, such
as judicial proceedings, are so important that related statements are "absolutely" privi-
leged. Such privilege completely bars defamation liability.'" Second, when the interest to
be furthered is less important, but still deserves some protection, courts have established
"qualified," or conditional, privileges. A plaintiff' may overcome a qualified privilege by
showing that a defendant "abused," and thus lost, the privilege. 3 °
Generally, courts grant a qualified privilege to communications advancing legitimate
interests of the publisher, of third parties, or of certain common interests.'' Many
employer communications satisfy the requirements of the qualified privilege classifica-
tion. Courts first recognized an employer's need for protection from strict. liability in the
kite 1700's, when the courts protected references made by masters for former household
to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence On the part of the publisher; and (d)
either actionahility of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication." Id. An extensive definition of what constitutes a defamatory statement
is beyond the scope of this note.
22 Case Comment, To Defeat a Conditional Privilege a Plaintiff in a Defamation Action Must Prove
"New York Times" Malice Marchesi v. Franchino, 39 Mn. L. REV. 515, 518 (1980). By "malice,"
the early courts meant subjective feelings of ill will or spite. See infra note 36 and accoinpanying
text.
23 See, e.g., Nichols v. Eaton, 110 Iowa 509, 81 NAV. 792 (1900); Kruger Grocery & Bakery Co.
v. Flarpole, 175 Miss. 277, 166 So. 335 (1936). See generally Case Comment, supra note 22, at 518.
21 PROSSER, supra note 4, § 1 13, at 804.
25 Id.
2"	 § 114, at 815.
27 Id. § 115, at 825.
"See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
29 PuossEu, supra note 4,	 114, at 815. Protected areas include, e.g., judicial proceedings,
husband and wile relations, political broadcasts.. See id. § 114, at 816-24.
so Id. § 115, at 824-25.
31 Id. § 114, at 825-32. Courts have created several Formulae to determine whether a given
interest satisfies the requirements of qualified privilege. Baron Parke reasoned that a communication
enjoys a qualified privilege if it is "fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or
private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his
interest is concerned." Toogood v. Spyring, l C.M. & R. 181, 193, l49 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1049-50
(Ex. D. 1834). An alternative approach is to grant the privilege to a communication that advances
the publisher's own legitimate interests, the interests of the recipient or a third party, those of the
publisher and the recipient in common, or those of the public in general. See PROSSER, supra note
4, § 115, at 825-32.
746	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 29:743
servants. 32 The traditional justification for making employer references privileged was
that strict liability allegedly would impede the flow of information. 33 An early nineteenth
century English court justified the privilege on the ground that "it would be impossible
for any master so understanding the law (at least with any regard to his own safety), to
give any character but the most favourable to a servant. ..." 34
In order to show "abuse," and thereby to overcome this qualified privilege, the early
doctrine required employees to show that malice had been a motivating factor in giving
the reference.35 The earlier courts generally defined malice as ill will, hatred or spite. 36
By concentrating solely on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff, courts provided
a great degree of protection for masters, allowing recovery only where their actions were
outrageous."
B. The Increased Use of Employment References and Current Standards of Abuse
Over the last two centuries, accompanying the great industrial and general economic
boom, the number of employer-written references has dramatically increased.'" Cur-
rently, employers review references by the millions. 3" Employment references serve two
functions. First, they provide useful objective and subjective information to the pro-
spective employer.'" Employers discover the nature of the applicant's former position
and responsibilities, how long the employee filled various positions, and whether the
applicant received praise for good work or indictments for alleged misconduct.'" Second,
references help employers maintain employee control in the workplace because the fear
of bad references constrains employee misconduct.'" Courts have recognized the potency
of bad references and their deterrent effect upon misconduct."'
Certain employer abuses concerning the use of references have surfaced." Because
employees are unable to check the accuracy of recommendations, employers may provide
inaccurate, unjust and ruinous information.'" To compound the problem, because ref-
erences provide an efficient means of disregarding a sizeable fraction of the applicant
pool, prospective employers use references despite the fact that they arc often unreliable
predictions of applicants' potential.'"
In the context of the increasing use of defamatory references, American courts
adopted the qualified privilege doctrine from England. The American courts, however,
developed the definition of the requisite "abuse" needed to overcome the privilege in a
5't
	 e.g., Rogers v. Clifton, 127 Eng. Rep. 317 (C.P. 1803).
33 See Note, supra note I, at 151.
34 Rogers, 127 Eng. Rep. at 319.
m Id. at 320.
56 See Case Comment, supra note 22, at 521 n.51; see also Note, supra note 1, at 157.
" Note, supra note 1, at 157.
55 /d. at 146.
39 See id. at 143.
4 ° Id. at 147.
-" Id,
42 1d. at 148.
43 Id. at 198 n.25.
44 See, e.g., Calera v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) (employer
gave employee a defamatory reason for discharge).
45 Note, supra note 1, at 143.




fashion more favorable to employees. Courts attempted to move away from the subjective
inquiry regarding ill will and spite toward a more objective standard which considered
the defamor's belief in the veracity of a given publication." By inquiring into this belief,
courts would infer malice from an employer's communication of information that it did
not reasonably believe was true, and courts no longer required an affirmative showing
of spite or ill will. This approach of inferring malice is the "common law malice"
standard."
Employees therefore acquired two methods of proving malice, and thus abuse.
Under one method, a plaintiff could recover by proving "true" malice, that is, subjective
ill will or spite. if a plaintiff failed to prove "true" malice, the court could infer malice
by showing that defendant communicated defamatory statements absent probable
grounds from which a reasonably prudent employer could have concluded that the
statements were true. 49 This presumption of malice allowed plaintiffs to recover in far
more circumstances than under the original English standard of "true" malice. 5°
States maintain a great degree of freedom to establish definitions of abuse and
remain within constitutional boundaries oldie first amendment.• As a result, the current
" The United States Supreme Court, in White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845), adopted
a reasonableness, probable cause standard of care applicable to qualified privilege situations. The
Court held that a showing that a defamor uttered a false statement, without a probable cause belief
in its accuracy, amounts to proof of the "malice" necessary to overcome the privilege. Id. at 291; see
also Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Harp°le, 175 Miss. 227; 238-39, 166 So. 335, 338-39 (1936)
(malice needed, but lack of grounds for belief has hearing).
48
 Common law malice is distinguishable from "actual malice," the standard the United States
Supreme Court recognized as applicable to defamation cases regarding public figures. Sec infra
note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
19
 Furthermore, juries could infer malice from the mere existence of falsity, without regard to
the employer's belief in the veracity of the statement, See Note, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme
Court Adopts Self-Publication Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 7l MINN. L. REv. 1092, 1110 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 222, 224-25.
'" Professor Prosser suggests that the comanon denominator of this common law malice standard
is that defendants abuse the privilege when primary use of the publication is to protect an interest.
for which the privilege is not given. See littossEu, supra note 4, § 115, at 834. Section 603 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that one abuses a qualified privilege "if he does not act for the
purpose of protecting the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 6, § 603.
51
 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, held that a
plaintiff may overcome a qualified privilege to defame a public official only by proving "actual
malice." 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). To establish the "abuse" necessary to overcome the privilege,
the actual malice standard requires the defendant to have made the statement with knowing falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. Under this standard, to establish "abuse" the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant possessed "a high degree of awareness ... of probable ... falsity." Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). In other words, the defendant must have "entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
In justifying the new standard the Court reasoned that "would-be critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to he true and even though
it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. In 1967, the Court extended the privilege and
the actual malice standard to statements concerning public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967). lu 1971, the Court extended the privilege to communication concerning
matters of "public or general concern." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971).
In Gertz v. Robert. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court held that in order for
a private plaintiff to recover compensatory damages against a media defendant., the plaintiff must
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law is both unclear and inconsistent as to what constitutes the abuse necessary to over-
come an employer's qualified privilege to defame. Jurisdictions adopt differing combi-
nations and variations of negligence, recklessness, common law malice and actual mal-
ice. 52
 Although there is confusion, a general pattern emerges.
The employer qualified privilege is recognized nearly universally. 53 To overcome
this privilege, courts require a finding of common law malice coupled with a negligence
standard. 54 This majority view finds liability upon a showing of a negligent lack of
concern for a statement's veracity," or a truly spiteful state of mind." A minority of
jurisdictions are more stringent and apply the New York Times "actual malice" standard.
The New York Times standard considers only the defamor's belief in the truth of the
statement and requires a determination of recklessness in order to find liability. 57 Thus,
in states applying the New York Times standard, a showing of "true" malice, that is, real
spite or ill will, is not sufficient to constitute abuse absent a showing of a reckless disregard
for the truth of a statement."
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SELF-PUBLICATION EXCEPTION TO THE PUBLICATION
REQUIREMENT
"Publication" is an essential element in the defamation action." Generally, publica-
tion occurs when a defendant communicates a defamation to an individual other than
the person defamed. 51) This communication may be oral, written or conveyed by gesture
establish fault. Id. at 347. Further, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish actual
malice. Id. at 349, Gertz concerned only media defamation, id. at 347, and thus does not mandate
application of the standard to the employment context. Most states, however, have adopted Gertz
and applied the standard to employer defamation suits as a matter of state law. PROSSER, supra note
4, § 113, at 807; see also Note, supra note 1, at 173 n.134. For a complete discussion of the Gertz
application by the Maryland courts, see Case Comment, supra note 1'3a, at 524-25.
52 See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 833-35.
." Note, supra note 1, at 161. The only state that does not recognize qualified privilege in all
cases is Michigan, which maintains strict liability for employers who include charges of criminal
activity in recommendations. Harrison v. Arrow Metal Products Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 612-
13, 174 N.W.2d 875. 886 (1969).
" See Note, supra note 1, at 160-64.
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 115, at 835. One commentator states that the general "rule is
that the defendant is required to act as a reasonable person under the circumstances, with due
regard to the strength of his belief, the grounds that he has to support it, and the importance of
conveying the information." Id.
56 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying (ext.
57 Three states have adopted the actual malice standard in the employment context. See Aspell
v. American Contract Bridge League, 122 Ariz. 399, 401, 595 P.2d 191, 193 (Ct. App. 1979);
Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 455, 548 1).2(1 1223, 1228 (1976); Marchesi v. Franchino, 283
Md. 131, 138, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978). The Second Restatement also suggests the use of actual
malice: "one who upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege publishes false and
defamatory matter concerning another abuses the privilege if he: (a) knows the matter to be false,
or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 600. In
section 603, however, the Restatement seems to suggest a functional equivalent to the common law
malice standard. Id. § 603 comment a. See also supra text accompanying note 51.
r See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 21.
n° See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 113, at 797.
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or by exhibition of a picture." A defendant is not liable when a plaintiff voluntarily, 62
or negligently" repeats a defamatory statement to another. Although a communication
directly to a plaintiff generally does not constitute publication," the common law rec-
ognized exceptional circumstances in which such a communication constituted an ac-
tionable publication.
A. Initial Recognition of the Self-Publication Doctrine
Courts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found liability when a
defendant reasonably should have foreseen that the plaintiff would be required to
republish the defamation. 65 These cases were limited to factual circumstances in which
republication was a near certainty." Therefore the majority of the cases involved libelous
letters" rather than slanderous statements, because it is easier to republish the written
word than it is to repeat verbatim a spoken message. Courts also considered the imma-
turity of the plaintiff as well as any obvious handicap, such as blindness or illiteracy,
which could lead the reasonably prudent employer to believe that the plaintiff would
repuhlish. 68
These early decisions that recognized self-publication defamation based liability on
proximate cause principles." Courts thus found liability when the republication was a
foreseeable necessity. 70 One of the first cases to recognize self-publication was Allen v.
Wortham in 1890. 71 In Allen, the court held that sending a defamatory letter to an illiterate
"' Id. For a complete discussion of the publication element of defittnalion, see id. at 797-802.
12 See, e.g., Merritt v. Detroit Memorial Hosp., HI Mich. App. 279, '284-86, 265 N.W.2d 124,
126-27 (1978) (the court held that the plaintiff hospital clerk voluntarily republished a defamatory
statement when she informed a prospective employer hospital that her former employer discharged
her for drug abuse).
65 See, e.g., Olson v. Molland, 181 Minn. 364, 366, '232 N.W. 625, (i25 (1930).
" See Carson v. Southern Ry. Co.,494 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 (D.S.C. 1979); Church of Scientology
of California v. Green, 354 F. Stipp. 800, 804 (S.D.NN, 1973); see also PROSSER, supra note 4, § 113,
at 797-98 ("Where there is no communication to any one but the plaintiff there may be criminal
responsibility, or a possible action for the intentional infliction of mental suffering, but no tort.
action can be maintained upon the theory of defamation.").
6' See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Allen v. Wortham, 89 Ky. 485, 486-88, 13 S.W. 73. 74 (1890) (publication when an
illiterate addressee of a letter asked a third person to read the letter to him); Kramer v. Perkins,
102 Minn. 455, 456-58, 113 N.W. 1062, 1063-64 (1907) (publication when a letter was addressed
to the plaintiff and his wife, and both read it); Rumney v. Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, I45-46, 71
N.E. 316, 316-17 (1904) (publication when the sender a a letter knew that the addressee's daughter
was accustomed to opening letters addressed to addressee); Lane v. Schilling, 130 Or. 119, 123-24,
279 P. 267, 268 (1929) (publication when a blind addressee of a letter asked his wife to read it to
him).
68 See, e.g., Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, Inc., 211 N.C. 551, 554, 191 S.E. 33, 35 (1937)
(publication when a minor showed a defamatory and threatening letter to adults to receive advice);
Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 314, III S.F. 517, 520 (1922) (publication when a minor
showed a defamatory and threatening letter to adults to receive advice); Lane, 130 Or. at 123-24,
279 P. at 268 (publication when a blind addressee was compelled to show the letter to another). See
also Stevens v. Haering's Grocetorium, 125 Wash. 404, 405-06, 216 P. 870, 871 (publication when
- a hysterical plaintiff disseminated content of defendant's statement).
60 See the discussion of Iledgpeth, infra note 77 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
71 89 Ky. 485, 13 S.W. 73 (1890).
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addressee constituted publication." The court wrote that "such exposure of the subject-
matter of [the letter] was the proximate, and, under the existing condition, inevitable
consequence of his act of writing and sending, and he should, therefore, be held to have
published it.""
In Hedgpeth v. Coleman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1922 further
explained the proximate cause rationale. 74 In Hedgpeth, sending a defamatory and threat-
ening letter to a juvenile constituted publication." The court held that the exception to
the no liability rule for "plaintiff-republications" is "based upon the principle that the
act of disclosure arises from necessity."76
 After noting the applicability of the proximate
cause analysis," the court held that in order to establish a publication "the defendant
must have foreseen the plaintiff's necessary exposure of the letter as the natural and
probable result of the libel," and that the defendant should have foreseen that necessity.
Similarly, in Lane v. Schilling, the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1929 allowed recovery
when the plaintiff proved the elements of foreseeability and necessity." The court held
the defendant liable because he knew that the plaintiff was blind and necessarily would
be compelled to have somebody else read the letter to him."
Thus, as with any other tort, courts found defendants liable for injuries that their
negligence proximately caused. Liability would result where the defendant could rea-
sonably foresee that the plaintiff would be required to republish, If a republication was
72 Id. at 486-88, 13 S.W. at 74.
" Id. at 487, 13 S,W. at 74 (emphasis added).
74
 183 N.C. 309, 111  S.F. 517 (1922).
" Id. at 314, 111  S.E. at 520.
76 Id. (emphasis added).
77 The court explained:
The ultimate concern is the relation that existed between the writing of the paper and
the disclosure of its contents by the plaintiff. For running through the entire law of
tort is the principle that a causal relation must exist between the damage complained
of and the act which occasions the damage.
Id. at 313, 111 S.E. at 519.
78 Id. at 314, Ill S.E. at 520 (emphasis added). The court further stated:
There is no publication such as to give rise to a civil action where libelous matter is
sent to the person libeled, unless the sender intends or has reason to suppose that the
matter will reach third persons (which in fact happens) or such result naturally flows
from the sending.
Id. at 313, 111 S.E. 519 (quoting S'rRen'r's FOUND. LEGAL LIABILrry Vol 1, 296). See also 36 C.J. Libel
and Slander 172, at 1225 (1924):
Printing a libel is regarded as a publication when possession of the printed matter is
delivered with the expectation that it will be read by some third person, provided that
such result actually follows. The rule, that there is no publication when words are
communicated only to the person defamed, is subject to exception or qualification.
Thus, in the case of a libel, whether the general rule extends to a disclosure by the
person libeled is to be determined by the casual [sic] relation existing between the libel
and publication.
Id.; see also Annotation, Libel and Slander: Communication of Defamatory Matter Only to Person Defamed
as a Publication Which Will Support a Civil Action, 24 A.L.R. 237, 242 (1923) ("However, many cases
make an exception to, or qualification of, the general rule, where the utterer of the defamatory
matter intends, or has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter will come
to the knowledge of some third person.").
79





a superseding intervening cause, such as plaintiff's voluntary actions, the intervening
cause would prevent liability.
B. Application of the. Self
-Publication Doctrine to the Employment Context
Self-publication defamation in the employment context is gaining recognition. Six
jurisdictions — California, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Texas — rec-
ognize self-publication," and two jurisdictions — Colorado and Washington — have
failed to adopt it when faced with similar fact patterns. 82
 Each court that has adopted
the doctrine has embraced the proximate cause analysis and thus requires a showing of
some degree of "foreseeability" and "compulsion."' In order to satisfy these elements,
however, the jurisdictions require differing levels of compulsion." In all but one of the
jurisdictions" the standards are such that an employee who was discharged for defa-
matory reasons and who repeated those reasons to a prospective employer during a job
interview likely will recover. 8°
Courts used the common law concepts of foreseeability and necessity when applying
the self-publication doctrine to the employment context. In 1946, the Georgia appellate
court, in Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, was the first to apply the doctrine to the employ-
ment relationship." Colonial Stores involved the application of the War Manpower Reg-
ulations, which required an employer to give a discharged employee either a statement
of availability or a restricted statement of availability." Under the regulations, a pro-
spective employer could not hire applicants who presented restricted statements of
availability. 89
 The plaintiff employee received a restricted statement. When he showed it
to prospective employers, they refused to hire him."" He then sued his former employer
for libel." In holding for the employee, the court reasoned that the initial libel directed
to the plaintiff constituted publication because the employer delivered the libel to the
employee with the expectation that third parties would read it, and third parties in fact
did read the statement.°2
 The common law requirement of inevitability was met, the
court stated, because the regulations required the plaintiff to republish the statement. 93
8 ' See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal, App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980);
Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2cl 306; Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App.
452, 168 N.W.2d 389; Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876 (Minn. 1986); Herberholt v. Del'aul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1981)
(en banc); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1080),
82 See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 725 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) and l..unz v. Neuman,
48 Wash.2d 26, 290 P.2d 697 (1955).
8 ' See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84 Id.
88
 The Georgia court only allows recovery where the plaintiff is required legally to republish.
Brantley, 101 Ga. App. 16, 112 S.E.2d 605.
A' See infra notes 117-67 and accompanying text.
87
 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946).
88 Id. at 840, 38 5.E.2d at 307.
89 Id.
9° Id.
In Id. The court stated that "the evidence amply authorized a finding that those prospective
employers would have employed him had it not been stated in the certificate that he had been
discharged because of 'improper conduct toward fellow employees.
— Id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 308.
92
 The court cited to 36 C.J. Libel and Slander 172. See .supra note 78.
93
 The court reasoned that the "defendant, when it gave said certificate to Barrett, knew that
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Michigan, in the 1969 case of Grist v. Upjohn Co., was the second state to recognize
self-publication in the employment context. 94
 In that case, the court of appeals broadened
the scope of the self-publication doctrine by finding liability for slanderous statements
that present a less-than-certain likelihood of republication.95 In Grist, the discharged
plaintiff employee brought a slander action against her former employer." After her
employer told the employee defamatory reasons for her discharge, the plaintiff claimed
that she was forced to repeat those reasons to prospective employers when detailing her
previous position. 97
 The trial court allowed the jury to find publication even though the
employer communicated the defamatory statement only to the plaintiff." The appellate
court affirmed and held that a publication exists where an employer intends or has
reason to believe that "in the ordinary coiirse of events" third persons will gain knowledge
of the defamatory matter. 99
The Grist court analogized to Colonial Stores and followed that court's holding despite
the existence of libel in the former case and slander in the latter.'N The court held that
the rule is broad enough to include slanderous statements as well as libelous docu-
ments. 191
 The decision thus required the employer to have foreseen that republication
would "naturally flow" from a spoken defamatory statement by an employer. Further-
more, liability attached despite the absence of a legal requirement that the employee
republish. 102
Thus, the first two jurisdictions to recognize the self-publication doctrine in the
employment context disagreed as to the appropriate standard of compulsion the courts
ought to apply. Whereas the Michigan courts do not require legal compulsion,'" the
Georgia courts require plaintiff employees to have been compelled legally to republish.' 94
Although the Georgia court left open the possibility of extending the doctrine to situa-
tions lacking legal compulsion,'" later courts declined the invitation. 1"
it would be presented by Barrett to one or more other persons, towit [sic], Barrett's prospective
employers, and that Barrett was required to so present it by a regulation of' the War Manpower
Commission." Barrett, 73 Ga. App. at 841, 38 S.E.2d at 308.
94 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969).
9' See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
96
 16 Mich. App. at 455, 168 N.W.2d at 391.
9' See id. at 485, 168 N.W.2d at 405-06.
9R Id.
9" Id. at 485, 168 N.W.2d at 406. The court stated: "Where the conditions arc such that the
utterer of the defamatory matter intends or has reason to suppose that in the ordinary course of
events the matter will come to the knowledge of some third person, a publication may be effected."
Id.; see also Annotation, supra note 78, at 242.
Grin, 16 Mich. App. at 485, 168 N.W.2d at 405-06.




'm See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
I " Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d 307. The court held that a publication exists
when "the sender intends or has reason to suppose that the communication will reach third persons,
which happens, or which result naturally flows from the sending." Id. (quoting 36 C.J. Libel and
Slander § 172, at 1225). Since, boi,Vever, the court held that "[t]his rule is particularly applied" to
situations necessitating disclosure, id., the court, in effect, did not foreclose the possibility of finding
a publication in a situation lacking any legal compulsion.
1"0 See, e.g., Brantley v. Heller, 101 Ga. App. 16, 112 S.E.2d 685 (1960) (court of appeals refused
to extend the doctrine to a situation where no statute, decree or regulation legally required the
employee to republish).
May 1988]	 SELF-PUBLICATION DEFAMATION	 753
Among those jurisdictions that have adopted self-publication, Georgia imposes the
highest standard of proof. In the 1960 case of Brantley v. Heller, the Court of Appeals
of Georgia, on facts similar to those of Colonial Stores, refused to extend the scope of
self-publication so as to allow recovery when no statute, decree or regulation forced the
employee to republish. 1 °7 In Brantley, the employee sued his employer insurance company
for libel contained in a separation notice the employer delivered to the Employment
Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor.'°5 The employee argued that he
was unable to secure employment without obtaining fair reference from the defendant
employer and without revealing the reasons for leaving his former employment. 109 The
Employment Security Law required the employer to submit a separation notice to the
Employment Security Agency whenever a worker left the organization."° The statute,
however, did not require the employer or the employee to disclose to prospective em-
ployers the contents of the notice."' Under these facts, the Georgia court held that no
publication existed because there was no legal requirement that the employee repeat the
libel. 12 The Brantley court mentioned the War Manpower Act's "legal requirement" in
Barrett and distinguished the Brantley facts from the Barrett case: "[W]hile the plaintiff
[in Brantley] alleged that in order to obtain employment he was forced to exhibit the
separation he was.not required to do so as was the plaintiff in the [Colonial Stores] case
"u.5
The Georgia court maintained its strict "legal compulsion" standard in the 1981
case of Sigmon v. Womack.'" In Sigmon, the employer supermarket discharged the em-
ployee. In a memorandum concerning her discharge the employee described the reason
for termination as "mishandling of company funds." 15 The court held that the employee
voluntarily informed the prospective employer of.the defamatory reason for discharge
and that therefore the plaintiff, not the supermarket, damaged her own reputation. 115
Thus, Georgia presently maintains the "legal compulsion" position in defining its com-
pulsion standard.
Two jurisdictions — California and Minnesota — apply standards of compulsion
that are less strict than the Georgia standard. These courts do not require a showing of
legal compulsion to republish. Rather, they require proof of the employee's "strong
compulsion"" 7 or "significant compulsion" 1 18 to republish. In the 1980 California case
"" See Brantley, 101 Ga. App, at 21, 112 S.E.2d at 689.
I" Id. at 16, 112 S.E.2d at 686.
169 1d,
110 Id. at 19, 112 S.E.2d at 688. The rule was authorized by "the act of 1937 (Ga. Laws 1937,
pp. 806, 826), as amended by the act of 1950 (Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 37, 47; Code Ann., § 54-632)."
Id. at 20, 112 S.E.2d at 688.
111 Brantley, 101 Ga. App. at 21, 112 S.E.2d at 689.
" 2
 Id.
"3 Id. The court held that the publication to the Employment Security Agency was not action-
able because the statute provided that such communications were absolutely privileged. See id. at
20-21, 112 S.E.2d at 689.
114
 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981).
"5 Id. at 48, 279 S.E.2d at 256.
116 Id. at 49, 279 S.E.2d at 257. Although the court did not cite Brantley or explain the holding
any further than indicated in the text, it did give a "compare" cite to Barrett. Id. at 49, 279 S.E.2d
at 257.
'" The California Court of Appeals established this "strong compulsion" standard in McKinney
v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 797, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1980).
118
 The Supreme Court of Minnesota established this "significant compulsion" standard in Lewis
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. 1986).
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of McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, the defendant city terminated the plaintiff's em-
ployment as a probationary deputy sheriff and gave the plaintiff defamatory reasons for
the dismissal. 119 The employee republished the statements by divulging their substance
to prospective employers while applying for positions at various police departments.'"
The employee insisted, and the California Court of Appeals agreed, that the republi-
cation was required of him as a practical matter by the police agencies at which he
applied for a new job, and was not, therefore, a voluntary repetition. 421
The California court, in recognizing self-publication, cited to other jurisdictions'
acceptance of the doctrine and those courts' tendency to find a valid publication where
the republication was "the natural and probable consequence of the originator's ac-
tions." 122 The court held that the publication element is satisfied where the defamor "has
reason to believe that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose
the contents of the defamatory statement to a third person ...." 3 " The court imposed
liability because of the "strong causal link" between the employer's actions and the
damage that resulted from the republication.' 24
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the 1986 case of Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, recognized the self-publication doctrine and adopted a slightly
less strict version of the McKinney "strong compulsion" standard. 125 In Lewis, the defen-
dant insurance company discharged the plaintiff dental claim approver for the defa-
19 110 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (1980).
IP Id. at 792-93, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
Id. at 792-93, 799, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 91, 95.
1 " Id. at 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93..
'" Id. at 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
' 24 Id. at 797-98, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The court reasoned:
This causal link is no less strong where the foreseeable republication is made by the
person defamed operating under a strong compulsion to republish the defamatory
statement and the circumstances which create the strong compulsion are known to the
originator of the defamatory statement at the time he communicates it to the person
defamed.
Id.
At present, although no other jurisdiction has adopted the McKinney "strong compulsion"
standard for employment cases, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in Belcher v. Little, adopted this standard
when applying the self-publication doctrine to slander of title cases. 315 N.W.2d 734, 737-38 (Iowa
1982). The court cited to McKinney and held that a publication exists if the defendant "should have
reasonably anticipated" that the plaintiff would he "under a strong compulsion to make (a] disclo-
sure." Id. at 738. Iowa courts may extend Belcher to recognize self-publication with respect to
employment when the opportunity arises.
12' 389 N.W.2d at 887. The court implicitly was concerned with the protection of employee
rights. The district court expressed these concerns:
In the Court's judgment, there is good social reason for an appellate court in Minnesota
to accept the concept of defamation by republication. Rejecting it means that an
employer who terminates an employee could say anything at all about that employee
at the time of termination and, even if it is foreseeable that the employee, in looking
for a job, would be required to state the reason for his termination, no liability would
attach to the employer, regardless of what was said to the employee as the reason for
termination. There was a compelling reason, therefore, for this Court to accept the
concept of defamation by republication . . . There is an even more compelling necessity,
in the social and economic climate in which we live, for this concept to be adopted by
an appellate court in Minnesota.
Lewis, C8-1065 slip op. at 19-20.
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matory reason of "gross insubordination." 1211 Prospective employers asked the plaintiff
to explain her termination and then refused to hire her after she had revealed the "gross
insubordination" statement. Employers would not hire her even though she explained
the circumstances leading up to the dismissa1. 127 The court held that a publication may
exist if the defendant could have foreseen that the plaintiff' would be compelled to
publish the defamatory statement to a third person.' 28
Although the Lewis court acknowledged the "strong compulsion" language of
McKinney, it required that the circumstances "in some significant way" compel the plain-
tiff to republish.'" The Minnesota court, however, suggested an unprecedented require-
ment. It noted that courts could require employees to mitigate damages by taking "all
reasonable steps" to contradict the defamatory statements and to explain to prospective
employers the "true nature" of the situation that led to the discharge. ISO Thus, in a
jurisdiction adopting this mitigation requirement, even one who is capable of proving
the appropriate degree of compulsion will not recover if the plaintiff fails to establish
the existence of good faith attempts to naitigate.' 5 '
The Lewis decision was the first opinion to address the the self-publication doctrine's
potential chilling effect upon employer communication.' 52 The court noted that the
doctrine merely establishes liability for damages that are the direct result of the origi-
nator's actions. 155 The court concluded that as long as courts enforce mitigation require-
ments, the doctrine "does not unduly burden the tree communication of views or
unreasonably broaden the scope of defamation liability."'"
In contrast to the majority's reliance on mitigation to solve any difficulties with the
doctrine, the dissenting opinion asserted that mitigation was itself a problem.' 35 The
12'3 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 880.
127 Id. at 882. The employer charged the plaintiff with "gross insubordination" for having
refused to alter personal expense reports which inaccurately reflected her actual expenses during
the period. Id. at 881.
' 2,,
 Id. at 888.
129 Id.
"0 Id.
131 Id. Based on the court's language, it is unclear whether the court would demand a showing
of mitigation as a legal requirement to be met as a prerequisite for recovery or whether the court
merely would consider such mitigation as a factor when determining liability. See Note, supra note
49, at 1103 n.56.
"2 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
17![
1 " Id.
) 35 Id. at 896. (Kelley, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge in the court of appeals argued that
by applying the self-publication doctrine in the employment context, the court, in effect, was
"recognizing, in thin disguise, the tort of wrongful termination rejected by [the Supreme Court of
Minnesota]." Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875, 884
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting). This dissent reasoned that interviewers almost
always require information regarding reasons for termination, and therefore employees arc almost
always under a foreseeable strong compulsion to republish. The dissent continued that since many
"terminations may, give rise to a defamation action," id. at 884, courts, in effect, may find employers
liable for the mere act of discharging employees for reasons it deems improper. Thus, the dissent
concluded, the doctrine is a backdoor recognition of wrongful termination. Id.
The majority in the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected this argument. The
Lewis court claimed that the dissent in the lower court misread Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 4i9, 234
N.W.2d 775 (1975), the case that rejected wrongful discharge tort liability. The Lewis court reasoned
that tort recovery could result from a bad-faith termination "where the defendant's breach of
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dissent insisted that recognition of self-publication defamation in the employment con-
text discourages employees from mitigating damages. 136
 As an example, the dissent noted
that the plaintiff initially sought to have the term "gross insubordination" expunged
from the employer's records as declaratory relief, but later abandoned this demand upon
realization that such an expungement would eliminate her basis of recovery for future
damages.'"
The dissent further asserted that, whenever an employee is discharged for "'incom-
petence,"dishonesty,"insubordination' or for any other reason carrying a connotation
of immorality, ineptness, or improbity, 'compulsion' will almost automatically be found
in connection with future job applications . . . "138 The dissent also stated that the
employer could always foresee that the discharged employee would repeat these
charges.'" The dissent insisted that the doctrine unduly burdens the tree communication
of views."° It concluded that, with implementation of the doctrine, employers could
avoid litigation and possible liability only by ceasing to communicate reasons for discharge
to employees and to other employers."'
Missouri does not require employees to show compulsion in order to establish
publication. In dictum, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in the 1981 case of Herberholt v.
dePaul Community Health Center, acknowledged the existence of the self-publication ex-
ception to the requirement of publication to a third party. 142 Paralleling the Grist decision,
the Herberholt court commented that a publication exists where the defamor-employer
should have foreseen that third parties could have received the information "in the
ordinary course of events." 143
In the 1985 case of Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, the Missouri
Court of Appeals cited the Herberholt dictum when recognizing self-publication in an
employment discharge suit.'" There, the, employer discharged the plaintiff clinic man-
ager, and said that the employee had "breached a patient's confidentiality," a defamatory
statement. 145
 The employer issued the employee a "service letter," pursuant to a Missouri
statute, which stated the reason for discharge. 146
 The employee alleged that although
the defendant sent the letter only to the employee herself, the defendant knew that the
letter would serve as a reference for prospective employers. 147
 The court reversed the
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's libel count, holding that it was sufficient to plead
contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort." 389 N.W.2d at 887-88 (quoting
Wild, 302 Minn. at 440, 234 N.W.2d at 789). The court concluded that "the fact that the defamation
occurred in the context of employment discharge should not defeat recovery." Id. at 888.






 Id. In this regard, it seems that the dissent implicitly was suggesting the use of the Georgia
"legal compulsion" standard. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
144 625 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (dicta) (publication present where health care
worker informed prospective employer of contents of service letter written by plaintiff's employer).
' 44 Id. at 624-25. The court wrote that a publication is effected if the defamor: "intends, or
has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter will come to the knowledge
of some third person." Id. (quoting 50 AM. Jun. 2n Libel and Slander § 148 (1970)).
144 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
145 Id. at 823.
146 id.
147 Id. at 825.
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that the defendant should have known that "in the ordinary course of events" third
parties would read the letter.' 48 Thus, in relying upon the "ordinary course of events"
language and no more, the Missouri court created a self-publication exception with no
apparent requirement of a showing of compulsion.
The standard applicable to the self-publication doctrine in Michigan is unclear. The
court in Grist v. Upjohn Co. used the same "ordinary course of events" language that the
Missouri courts later used in Herberholt and Neighbors.'" Although the Grist court anal-
ogized to the "legal compulsion" circumstances of Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, it neither
discussed the degree of the employee's compulsion nor offered a threshold of compulsion
necessary to establish liability.'"
After Grist, the Michigan courts did not reconsider the self-publication issue until
the 1978 case of Merritt v. Detroit Memorial Hospital."' There, the employer hospital
discharged the plaintiff ward clerk and told her the dismissal was for the defamatory
reason of drug abuse.'" The employee later applied for work to five hospitals and to
an employment agency, but she revealed the reasons for her dismissal to only one
hospital. 15 ' The Merritt court only considered the facts concerning the one hospital to
which the employee had repeated the defamation.'"
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the defendant could not
have reasonably foreseen that she would repeat the reasons to one of the hospitals.'"
The court then ruled that the employee, in republishing, had consented to the publi-
cation, 156 but the court offered no support for this conclusion. Thus, although the
Michigan court uses a Corm of the -ordinary course of events" foreseeahility standard,
a reading of Grist and Merritt does not provide an understanding of the parameters of
this standard.'"
The Texas standard For employment self-publication defamation similarly is not
clear. Although the courts claim that they rely upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
"unreasonable risk" standard,'" the courts' actual interpretation of that rule is question-
' Id.
1" 16 Mich. App. 162, 485, 168 N.W.2d 389, 406 (1969).
'" Id. at 484-85, 168 N.W,2d at 405-06.
' 5 ' 81 Mich. App. 279, 205 N.W.2d 124 (1978).
152 Id. at 282,.265 N,W,2d at 125.
155 /d. at 285-86, 265 N.W.2d at :127.
1" Id. at 284, 285, 265 N.W.2d at 126, 127.
' 56 /d. at 286, 265 N,W.2d at 127.
' 57 The Merritt court did not cite Grist or other self-publication cases in any other jurisdiction.
It is likely that the court reasoned that the republication was voluntary and therefore did not
constitute actionable publication. This conclusion is plausible because the employee failed to repeat
the defamation to the other prospective employers and therefore chose to do so in the one instance.
If the court did reason in this fashion, then the court was enforcing a compulsion standard. The
court's affirmation of the finding of no foreseeability, however, is unexplainable. Thus, the Michigan
courts have yet to form fully the sell-publication standard.
I " The "unreasonable risk" standard is described in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577
comments k and in (1977). The Restatement states:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defamatory matter
when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a third person or
with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communicated. (See § 8A).
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be inten-
tional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk
that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person, the conduct
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able. In the 1980 case of First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas adopted the self-publication ,doctrine in finding a bank chairman-employer
liable when he signed a fidelity bond claim and thereby falsely accused the discharged
employee of dishonesty.'" The plaintiff demonstrated that prospective bank employers
generally refuse to hire applicants who have been targets of fidelity bond claims." The
court held that a publication exists where "a reasonable person would recognize that an
act creates an unreasonable risk" of republication. 161 Applying this rule to the facts of
the case, the court held the employer liable because prudent bank employers should
know that during an interview or in a job application determining whether anyone had
filed a bond claim against the applicant is "natural inquiry by the banking profession."' 62
The court determined, therefore, that the application process "surely" would bring out
the existence of the claim. 163
 Although the case presented a situation where the employee
was compelled to republish, the court did not expressly require the need for such
compulsion.
In Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico, the Court of Appeals of Texas followed the
Ake rule, holding a defendant general contractor liable when he fired the plaintiff
subcontractor for defamatory reasons and the plaintiff then repeated the reasons for
termination to his employees to explain to them why they had to leave the job site.' 64
Under these circumstances, the court held, a jury properly could find that the plaintiff
satisfied the Ake rule because the employer could have recognized that the making of
the defamatory statement created an unreasonable risk of repetition.' 65 By applying this
standard, the court did not require compulsion and held that the employee established
a prima facie case when he established that the defendant's agent, "as a reasonably
prudent person, should have expected that his defamation of [the plaintiff] to his face
would be communicated to others by [the plaintiff]." 365
 The dissent, however, argued
that the appropriate standard should require a showing of compulsion to republish. 167
becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication amounts to a pub-
lication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
tn. Recipient it the defamed person. One who communicates defamatory matter directly
to the defamed person, who himself communicates it to a third person, has not
published the matter to the third person if there are no other circumstances. if the
defamed person's transmission of the communication to the third person was made,
however, without an awareness of the defamatory nature of the matter and if the
circumstances indicated that communication to a third party would be likely, a publi-
cation may properly be held to have occurred.
' 59 606 S.W.2d 696,698-99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
160 1d. at 702-03.
161 Id. at 701 (citing REsTATemENT, supra note 6, § 577, comment k (1977)).
162
 Id. at 702.
163 1d. The court noted that the defendant bank chairman, as well as another witness, testified .
that the employee "would have been remiss indeed not to have owned up to the fact that a bond
claim had been filed." Id. at 701.
' 64 696 S.W.2d 439,444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). The defendant charged the plaintiff with having
stolen materials from the job site and ordered him and his workers off the site immediately. Id.
165 Id. at 445.
166 Id. The defendant objected to the jury instructions and claimed that the trial judge should
have told the jury to find the defendant liable only if it determined that the employee was "reason-
ably required" to republish. Id.
, 67 Id. at 449. (Reeves, J., dissenting). The dissent insisted that neither the Chasewood Construction
nor the Ake court adequately differentiated between comments k and m of the Restatement "un-
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Thus, each of the six jurisdictions recognizing self-publication in the employment
context has based the doctrine on a proximate cause analysis. Although each court
appears to require a showing of employer kreseeability of republication, the jurisdictions
differ over the degree of employee compulsion required. Only two jurisdictions have
failed to recognize the self-publication doctrine after having considered cases involving
employee republication. The Supreme Court of Washington, in the 1955 case of Lunz
v. Neuman, did not mention the doctrine in its opinion)" The Colorado Court. of Appeals,
in the 1986 case of Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., in contrast, expressly rejected the
doctrine.'"
In Luta, the employee "was required to disseminate the alleged accusation in making
application for other employment ...." 17° The court did not mention any exception to
the general rule that communication to the defamed person alone does not constitute
publication. 1 " The court held that the plaintiff employee himself published the defa-
matory statements and that the employer thus was not liable.' 72
The Churchey Court expressly rejected the doctrine as applied in the employment
context.'" In this case, the employer discharged the plaintiff for "dishonesty," and
prospective employers required the disclosure of the reason for dismissal.'" The em-
ployee repeated the statement to interviewers who all refused to hire her. 175 Although
the court acknowledged the development of the self-publication doctrine in other juris-
dictions,' 7" it refused to adopt the rule in Colorado.'"
reasonable risk" standard. Id. 'Die dissent cogently argued that the Restatement provides a frame-
work that operates as a self-publication liability roadmap. If the employee made the repetition while
not aware of the defamatory nature of the matter. comment m would govern. Under comment tn,
a plaintiff in such a situation may recover if "the circumstances indicated that communication to a
third party would be likely." RESTATEMEIVT supra note 6, § 577 comment m.
When the employee has knowledge of the defamatory matter, the Restatement replaces the
"likely" requirement with the more stringent "substantially certain" standard of comment k. Under
comment k, liability results from both intentional and negligent communications. A defendant
intentionally communicates a defamation by acting either with the purpose of eventually informing
a third person or with actual knowledge that it is "substantially certain" that the plaintiff will
republish. Id., comment k. The second part of comment k governs the Ake and Rico situations. The
defendant would be liable if he or she negligently made the statement.. A negligent statement occurs
"if a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory
matter could he communicated to a third person." Id. See supra note 158 for full text. of § 577
comments k and in.
153 See 48 Wash. 2d 26, 33-34, 290 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1955) (facts establish employee republi-
cation).
' 6" 725 11 .2d 38, 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
17° 48 Wash. 2c1 at 33, 290 P.2d at 701.
IT' The court failed to cite to Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett.
' 72 48 Wash, 2d at 33-34, 290 P.2d at 701-02.
' 73 Churchry, 725 P.2d at 4 I.
174 1d. at 39.
175 Id.
17" Id. at 40.
' 77 Id. at 41. The lower court had recognized the doctrine but had held for the defendant
because she had failed to prove !'that defendant knew or should have foreseen that plaintiff would
be required to disclose the reason for her termination to prospective employers." Id. The Court of
Appeals offered no further rationale for its rejection of the doctrine. Rather, it cited to Lunz v.
Neuman and the Georgia case of &pion v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981), which
involved a voluntary self-publication. Sec infra note 184 For a discussion of the Churchey court's
reason*.
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When employers communicate to terminated employees defamatory reasons for
dismissal, the employees often are unable to secure subsequent employment because of
the defamatory communication. In order to provide legal recourse for such employees,
six jurisdictions have extended the law of defamation by recognizing the self-publication
doctrine in the context of employment relations. Relying on proximate cause tort prin-
ciples, in order to establish liability, these courts require a showing of employer foresee-
ability that republication will occur and various degrees of employee compulsion to
republish. Although two jurisdictions have refused to recognize the doctrine, the trend
evinces a gradual recognition of self-publication defamation in the employment context.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SELF-PUBLICATION DOCTRINE IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
This note suggests that the judicial trend toward adopting the self-publication doc-
trine in the employment context shOuld continue. The courts that have examined em-
ployee self-defamation have focused on the issue of whether the doctrine is an appro-
priate outgrowth of proximate cause tort principles.'" Most courts, however, have failed
to discuss policy justifications for adopting or rejecting the doctrine, despite the impor-
tance of the interests involved,'" Because employment is an individual's sole claim to
wealth and status, employees have an interest in protecting their reputation and their
ability to acquire gainful employment. Employers and society have a competing interest
in facilitating the flow of management-personnel information, and thereby insuring a
healthy economy. 180 The courts must address these policy concerns as well as the cau-
sation issue.
To achieve an appropriate balance of these competing policy interests, courts should
modify the definition of abuse of qualified privilege when they apply the privilege to a
self-publication situation. To safeguard the flow of communication between employers
and employees and also to protect employee rights, courts should apply a negligence
standard. In applying this standard, however, courts should consider only the employer's
belief in the truth of statements, and thereby should disregard any inquiry into "malicious
intent.""' Furthermore, courts should require the employer to foresee that the employee
will be under a strong or significant compulsion to republish, but should not require the
employee to be under a legal compulsion. 182 Further, courts should apply an objective
test when determining this compulsion standard. 183
A. The Strong and Significant Compulsion Tests — The Most Appropriate Standards for
Employment Self-Publication Defamation
The self-publication exception to the publication requirement is a valid application
of the general tort principle of proximate causation. Consistent with the notion that one
should be liable for the consequences foreseeably flowing from one's conduct, courts
have found employers liable when they should have foreseen the imminent damage
178
	
,CUPra note 124 and accompanying text for explanation of proximate cause principles.
"' The Lewis court was the only court to address the important policy concerns. See supra notes
132-34 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18 ' See supra notes 57-58 for a discussion of malicious intent.
182 See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
189 Id.
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resulting from a defamatory statement.'" To maintain the integrity of the causation
principle, however, courts must determine whether the circumstances necessitated the
employee's republication. If the employee voluntarily republished, such conduct should
operate as a superseding intervening cause and thus should prevent the employer from
incurring liability. 185
Georgia's legal compulsion standard strictly maintains the integrity of the foresee-
ability element of causation.'" Although this stringent rule would assure foreseeability,
it would deprive too many plaintiffs of relief. The legal compulsion standard originated
in 1946, when it was less common for prospective employers to demand reasons for
termination. 187 Employment conditions, however, have changed. Today, such demands
are standard procedure in several business sectors.'" Application of the "legal require-
ment" standard, therefore, would foreClose recovery for the majority of employees whose
former employers placed them in positions where they foreseeably would be compelled
to republish defamatory reasons for discharge to prospective employers. Accordingly,
courts should regard the Georgia standard as outdated.
Without further qualification, application of the "ordinary course of events"
standard' 99 and the "unreasonable risk" of republication standard' 9° could cause courts
to find employers liable despite a lack of employee compulsion. Although the standards
properly include a more flexible foreseeability test, they do not account for the traditional
tort notion of superseding cause."" That is, although these standards may satisfy the
forest- :ability element of the proximate cause principle, literal application may result in'
employer liability despite the voluntariness of employee disclosures.
This result occurred in Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico, where the Texas court
applied the "unreasonable risk" standard. 192 In Rico, the court correctly held that the
184 Washington and Colorado are the only two jurisdictions that have not embraced this fore-
seeability exception in the employment context. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
Neither jurisdiction, however, offers a convincing argument in favor of rejecting the doctrine. The
Supreme Court of Washington, in Lunz, did not mention the doctrine at all. See supra note 171 and
accompanying text. Although the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Churchey, acknowledged that other
jurisdictions had recognized the doctrine, the court summarily concluded, "We perceive no sound
reason for weakening the general rule by carving out an exception based on foreseeability in
employment termination cases," Churchey, 725 P.2d at 41. Rather than support its conclusion, the
court merely cites the Lunz case and the Georgia case of Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. at 49,279
S.E.2c1 at 257 (employee "libeled herself" when she informed an interviewer that she was discharged
for "misappropriation of company funds.") See supra note 177.
These cases, however, do not support an argument fOr non-recognition. As noted, the Lunz
case did not mention the doctrine at all. Furthermore, Sigmon does not stand for the proposition
that courts should not apply the self-publication doctrine to employment cases. Rather, the Churchey
court overlooked the fact that the Sigmon court was bound to follow the Georgia "legal compulsion"
standard. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Titus, neither Churchey nor Lunz offered any
substantive argument against recognition of the doctrine.
188 A plaintiff may not create a lawsuit by repeating a defamatory communication when the
defendant communicated only to the plaintiff. See supra note 9.
188 See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
"7 Id.
188 See supra note 135. Prospective interviewers almost always require information regarding
reasons for termination. Id.
189 Missouri courts have adopted this language. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
190 The Texas courts have adopted this language. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
" 1 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
1 " Chasewood Constr., 696 S.W.2d 439,445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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employer should have known that making the defamatory statement to the plaintiff
subcontractor created an "unreasonable risk" of repetition'" because it was reasonable
to believe that, under the circumstances, a good chance existed that the subcontractor
would republish the reasons for discharge.' 94 There is no independent guarantee, how-
ever, that the circumstances compelled the plaintiff to republish. Although a court may
choose to read into the standard a requirement of compulsion, there is no such require-
ment inherent in the words "unreasonable risk," nor in the words "ordinary course of
events." Thus, courts should be wary of adopting these standards. Courts that decide to
use this language should read concepts of compulsion into the standards.
The most appropriate standards are the "strong compulsion" and "significant com-
pulsion" standards of California• and Minnesota respectively. 196 These standards are
proper outgrowths of the proximate cause analysis. Employers should not be liable for
injuries caused by employees' voluntary actions. Proximate cause exists, therefore, only
where the employee believes he or she must republish. Provided the standards refer to
the employee's "objective" state of mind, the compulsion standards protect employees
who are under a practical compulsion to republish and prevent findings of employer
liability when an employee republishes voluntarily. Rather than relying on such vague
phrases as "ordinary course of events," courts should use the compulsion standards to
focus their attention on the practical implications of a given set of circumstances, and
thus on the objective state of the employee's mind.
In this manner, the law protects employees who must choose between two potentially
career-destroying courses of conduct — repeating the defamatory statement or refusing
to reveal the reasons for discharge. if the plaintiff repeats the defamatory statement,
the interviewer most likely will refuse to hire the applicant. Even after the plaintiff
attempts to explain the circumstances leading to the statement, it is probable that the
prospective employer will not take the risk of hiring a potential "trouble maker." On the
other hand, if the plaintiff refuses to reveal the reasons for discharge, the interviewer
similarly is unlikely to consider the plaintiff as a serious candidate for fear that the
discharged employee is "hiding something." The law should protect only those employees
caught in this "catch-22" predicament. Moreover, objective compulsion standards protect
employers against plaintiffs who falsely claim that they were compelled to republish
because courts applying the objective standard do not consider the employees' subjective
state of mind.'"
The use of an objective compulsion standard thus prevents courts from presuming
the presence of compulsion in each case. Courts should impose rigorous standards by
which plaintiffs must prove the practical need for the republication. For example, courts
could require plaintiffs to show that questions concerning reasons for discharge are not
only natural inquiries within the given occupational field, but also that a common
understanding exists among its members that failure to divulge such information often
will result in a rejection letter,' 98
191 Id.
194 Id. at 444.
193 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
' 96 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
197 Use of a subjective standard is inappropriate because an employee simply could allege the
"feeling of being compelled," and the employer would have the burden of disproving the feeling.
The employee could argue that the compulsion clearly existed because there is no other reason for
the employee to repeat the defamatory statement.
111" In First State Bank of Corpus Christi b, Ake, the court asked a question on these grounds and
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Once the plaintiff proves employer foreseeability of eventual employee compulsion,
courts should follow the lead of the Lewis court by requiring the plaintiff to prove an
attempt to mitigate damages.'" The law, however, should not enforce the duty to mitigate
by forcing the plaintiff to lie. 2" As indicated by the Lewis court, it is enough for courts
to require mitigation in the form of "talt[ing] all reasonable steps to attempt to explain
the true nature oldie situation and to contradict the defamatory statement." 2"' Mitigation
in the form of lying is hardly the type of conduct the law should encourage.
For the foregoing reasons, courts applying self-publication to employment relations
in the future should adopt either the "strong compulsion" or "significant compulsion"
standards. Courts, however, must adopt an objective test of employee compulsion in
order to avoid peering into an employee's subjective state of mind. Provided courts apply
one of these standards, or similar standards incorporating concepts of compulsion, and
also require a showing of mitigation, the application of the self-publication doctrine in
the employment context is at valid extension of defamation law.
B. Determination of the Most Appropriate Standard for Defining "Abuse of Qualified Privilege"
Although legal principles of causation alone support self-publications defamation,
most courts have failed to consider seriously the potential socio-economic effects that
could result from its application to the employment relationship. Each jurisdiction has
applied its abuse of privilege standard to the self-publication doctrine without consid-
ering how its standard would interact with the doctrine in the employment setting. This
comthingling of "abuse standards" with the concept of self-publication threatens em-
ployers' willingness to maintain communication flow. 2"2 Accordingly, courts must modify
the standards relating to abuse as they apply to employee self-publication defamation.
1. Policy Considerations — The Effect of Tort Liability on Communication Flow
Before determining which standard of abuse to apply, this note will consider the
importance of employers communicating to other employers and to their employees,
and will also consider how employers' tort liability may affect such communication. There
is general agreement that a pervasive policy of non-disclosure to employees as well as to
prospective employers would hinder the nation's productivity. 2" If employers refused
concluded: "It would have been a natural inquiry by the banking profession 	 whether a bond
claim had ever been filed against him." 606 S.W.2d 696,702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
1" See supra text accompanying note 1'35.
'1"" Another view is that courts should require employees to mitigate damages by not fully
disclosing the reasons for discharge. For example, the dissent from the decision of the court of
appeals in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States suggested that
an employee is only obligated to state the true reason for his termination. ... It is
apparent that the further from the truth the former employer's allegation is, the less
the employee is under a duty to "republish" it in a damaging form. In this case, a less
damaging characterization than "gross insubordination" would have been fully justi-
fied.
361 N.W,2d 875,884-85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting). However tempting this
approach may be, it cannot be justified morally or practically. First, courts should not condone
lying. Second, it is likely that experienced interviewers can sense when an interviewee is not revealing
the entire truth and in most cases will push for a complete disclosure.
'"' Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
202 See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of an appropriate standard
for determining abuse of privilege.
209 See Note, supra note 49, at 1113.
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to reveal reasons for discharge, not only would employees be deprived of the consolation
of knowing why they were terminated, but they would also have no basis for a claim of
wrongful discharge. 2" Employee frustration and lowered morale and effort, caused by
job insecurity, would decrease efficiency and eventually lower productivity. 205 Further-
more, the fact that non-disclosure policies would force employers to hire "employees
with mysterious pasts" would also decrease national productivity. 200
Fear of liability and damaging publicity may threaten the vital flow of communica-
tion. Common sense suggests that business people will elect to remain silent if silence
would avoid a lawsuit. 207
 Further, in light of potentially enormous pretrial litigation
expenses and negative publicity, silence is likely even where employers believe they would
win a lawsuit because their statements were true: 2" by attaching an ancillary defamation
claim to a wrongful discharge action, even a weak, unwarranted claim, a plaintiff could
increase the amount of a settlement. As one commentator has noted: "To avoid the
potential threat of higher settlements, employers are better off giving no reasons what-
soever for discharging employees even though the reasons may be true. Thus, employers
are discouraged from communicating with employees." 209
Liability alone', however, may not force employers to refrain from communicating
with employees and other employers if there exist sufficient incentives encouraging
continued cornniunication. 2 t 0 Depending on an employer's particular economic situation,
the employer may be willing to absorb the cost of liability for defamation rather than
limit communication. 2 " Judging by the increasing number of employers adopting non-
disclosure policies, 212 however, it would seem that most employers are not willing to risk
such liability 21s
In the long run, however, employers may realize the importance of employer-
employee and inter-employer communications, and reduce their chance of liability by
adopting creative methods of communication. For example, business and legal societies
already have suggested new procedures for employers to follow when discharging em-




207 By analogy to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, it is reasonable to assume that fear of liability
could chill speech. See supra note 51 for a discussion of New York Times.
208 See Note, supra note 49, at 1105 n.67.
292 Id.; see also McLanahan, The Mechanics far Handling Employee Terminations: Releases, Post-
Employment Proceedings and Related Problems, in 208 PRACTICING LEGAL. INST. LITIGATION & ADMIN.
PRAC. SERIES 131, 153 (1982). Absent a statute, employers are not required to supply employees
with any infbrmation concerning reasons for discharge. See id. at 151-52.
210 See Note, supra note 1, at 152.
211 One commentator has stated: "In the general context of tort liability, that issue is 'enterprise
liability': the imposition of tort liability on a business for injuries resulting from the business, thereby
producing economically rational behavior." Id.; see also Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of
Torts, 47 U. Cols]. L. REv. 153 (1976).
212 See, e.g., N1cLanahan, supra note 209. at 153.
2t'
	 phenomenon especially is present in the sell-publication situation because the second
reason for the importance or communication (i.e. employee control) is absent. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. Thus, the only remaining factor to encourage employees to behave is the
expectation of recommendations. Therefore, there is even less reason for employers to maintain
the practice of informing employees of discharge reasons. If employers, however, implement the
policies discussed infra. this argument fails. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits. 214 In addition, assuming that re-employed individuals will not sue, some em-
ployers have retained employment agencies to aid former employees seeking employ-
ment. 215 Thus, if' forced to, it appears that employers have the capacity to absorb the
costs of liability by creating,new programs and procedures. 215
2. Proposal for an Appropriate Standard of "Abuse of Qualified Privilege" — A
Negligence Standard Focusing- Only Upon the Employer's Belief in the Veracity of'
the Statement
Having discussed the importance of communication flow and how an employer's
liability may affect this flow, it now is possible to determine the appropriate standard
defining "abuse" of a qualified privilege for employee self-publication. In developing a
standard, courts must choose between a recklessness or simple negligence standard, In
light of the potential for employers to absorb the cost of liability, it would be a mistake
to apply the recklessness standard. The employee rights at stake are too important to
justify the establishment of such a severe standard, for requiring a showing of reckless
disregard for the truth would prevent most employees from recovering, despite the fact
that the employer's negligence .proxiMately caused severe injury to the employee's ability
to earn a living. 217
An alternative to "recklessness" is the simple negligence standard, applied by most
jurisdictions. 215 This standard comes closer to striking an appropriate balance among
the interests of employers, employees and society. Courts should hold employers liable
for careless utterances of inaccurate, ruinous statements. The negligence standard merely
demands that employers act as reasonably prudent persons when assigning reasons for
discharge. 219 Such a standard is not so strict as to be out of proportion with the great
interest in preventing needlessly ruined careers.
Although negligence may be the appropriate level of fault for the issuance of job
recommendations between employers, applying this standard to employee self-publica-
tion may favor employees to such a great extent that employers will refrain from telling
their employees why they were discharged. One reason for this dual effect is that
employers may value telling employees the reasons for their discharge less than they
214 See, e.g., McLanahan, supra note 209, at 151-52. For instance, McLanahan suggests that all
employers conduct exit interviews, and either prior to or after the interview. should: "Review the
specific reasons for termination; Check whether these reasons arc legally permissible ones; Review
the employee's file to determine if the documents support these reasons... ." Id,
215 See Note, supra note 49, at 1105 n.67.
215 For example, employers could institute certain policies of employer-employee collaboration
concerning discharge procedures and documentation. Employers and employees could cooperate
to design a joint written explanation of discharge reasons. Such a policy could encourage employers
to think more carefully about whether they actually can factually support the formal reason for
discharge. Such a policy might prevent a few employers from making defamatory statements.
Furthermore, if' the employee agrees to collaborate, then the employee may be estopped from
subsequently complaining about the assigned reason for discharge. Likewise, II' the employee
originally refused to participate, the employer Can use this refusal to collaborate against the em-
ployee as failure to mitigate.
217 Such a severe standard is reserved for public officials, as explained by the Supreme Court
in New York Times. See supra note 51.
218 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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value exchanging job recommendations with other employers. 22° Consequently, although
the negligence standard may not discourage the giving of performance recommendations
to other employers, that same standard may inhibit employers from informing employees
of reasons for discharge. In other words, employers may not value communicating to
employees the reasons for their discharge to the extent that they would be willing to
assume the cost of self-publication liability.
A second, and more important reason for this dual effect is that those jurisdictions
applying simple negligence standards also apply the common law malice standard in
conjunction with it. 221 Such judicial inquiry into "malicious intent" has no place in
determining employer liability in the self-publication context. The only valid consider-
ation is the determination of the employer's belief in the truth of the reason given for
termination. Once the courts examine the mind of an employer in search of bad feelings
toward an employee, the judicial system treads on the employer's right to implement
managerial decisions. Even if an employer's ill feelings toward an employee contributed
to the termination, as long as the employer reasonably believes the substance of the
communication to be true, liability should not result. The mere fact that an employer's
ill will may have partially or substantially motivated the communication does not negate
the value of the transfer of truthful information. Thus, defamation law should not find
the employer liable, absent a showing of carelessness toward ascertaining the truth.
Further, as noted earlier, application of the common law malice standard allows
juries to infer malice from the mere existence of some falsity, without regard to care-
lessness. 222 With this standard, in finding malice, it is uncertain upon which facts a jury
will focus. One commentator has noted that "the standard is vague and virtually no
guidelines are provided. Once falsity or partial falsity is determined ... juries are free
to infer malice. ... " 225 Thus, application of common law malice may result in an
improper finding of liability if, for example, a jury disagrees with an employer's char-
acterization of an employee's conduct as "gross insubordination," as in Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States. 224 Because of the existence of some "falsity," the
jury may find liability. 225 Thus, under the comtnon law malice standard, an employer
could be liable who, in the jury's opinion, merely mischaracterized an employee's conduct,
and such liability would result without inquiring whether a prudent employer would
have believed that characterization to be false. 22° Designed in this fashion, the law
operates as a means through which employees and juries may strip employers of their
right to implement managerial decisions.
The trend recognizing self-publication defamation in the employment context
should continue. The law should hold employers liable for the foreseeable consequences
of their actions and should not facilitate the needless destruction of careers and lives.
In establishing an appropriate theory of employee self-publication, however, courts must
2200n one hand, it is reasonable to suppose that employers gain much valuable information
from the free exchange of references concerning future employees' work records and accomplish-
ments. On the other hand, communication to employees concerning reasons For dismissal probably
does not aid employers nearly as much as does the exchange of job recommendations.
221 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
222 See Note, supra note 49, at 1110.
223 Id,
224 389 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 1986).
225 See. Note, supra note 49, at 1110.
226 Id,
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recognize that the common law malice standard is too vague. 227 Courts also must raise
employees' burden of proof by focusing upon employers' subjective belief in the veracity
of alleged defamatory statements, while disregarding inquiry into employers' subjective
feelings of' spite or ill will. Furthermore, courts must reject the "legal compulsion" and
"ordinary course of events" standards in favor of an "objective compulsion" standard.
This standard protects employees who are actually compelled to republish defamatory
statements, while assuring that employees not under such pressure do not create a cause
of action for themselves by voluntarily republishing.
1V. CONCLUSION
Employment is an individual's sole claim to wealth and status and is, therefore, an
essential factor in determining the contours of one's life. Courts thus are justified in
carving out the self-publication exception to the general rule of no liability when plaintiff's
themselves repeat defamatory statements. Furthermore, if applied properly, the doctrine
is consistent with the notion that one should be liable for injuries proximately caused by
one's negligence. In developing this exception, however, courts also MUst consider em-
ployers' and society's interest in maintaining the flow of management-personnel com-
munication.
In searching fOr the most appropriate standard of employee compulsion, a court
must develop a test that would allow employees a reasonable opportunity to recover,
while protecting employers against an onslaught of employee-created lawsuits. In light.
of these considerations, the most appropriate standard is an objective "strong compul-
sion" or "significant compulsion" standard. In applying the self-publication doctrine,
Owls must not apply the common law malice standard as a means of defining abuse of
qualified privilege to defame. By so doing, courts expose employers to unfair jury
findings of "malice" because the standard allows juries to infer the existence of malice
from the mere hint of employer ill will toward the employee. Courts must not subject
employers to findings of liability that rest upon vague, subjective notions of ill will; the
importance of management-personnel communication flow is far too important. Fur-
thermore, notions of ill will and spite have no place in the determination of liability for
employer-employee communication. Employers must be free to discharge an employee
because of the existence of bad feelings between the parties. Application of common law
malice, in effect, could serve as the first step toward forcing employers to retain disliked
employees. This result not, only is contrary to the notion of contractual freedom and
employer ability to hire employees of choice, but it could impair irreparably the flow of
management-personnel communication. The most appropriate standard to define
"abuse," therefore, focuses upon employers' subjective belief in the veracity of alleged
defamatory statements, while disregarding inquiry into employers' subjective feelings of
spite or ill will. In light of the interests that employees have in securing employment, it
is not much to ask that employers be careful when explaining reasons for discharge to
their employees. If properly applied, the self-publication doctrine could assure the
existence of this care.
GARY J. °BERSTEIN
227 See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
